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l ee  threats to Miranda The th 
I Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Schulhofer of the University of Chicago Law School has recently 
noted, a numbir of the Miranda safeguards "have 
now become entrenched in the interrogation 
procedures of many countries around the world." 
(See generally Craig Bradley, "The Emerging 
International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure 
Rules," 14 Michigan Journal of  International Law 17 1 
[1993].) 
But Miranda is in serious trouble at home. 
A provision of the federal criminal code enacted in 
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, purports to "repeal" Miranda 
and reinstate the pre-Miranda standard for the 
admissibility of confessions -the due process- 
"totality of circumstances"-"voluntariness" test. 
Section 3501 has been avoided by every 
administration since its enactment more than 30 
years ago. But this has not discouraged conservative 
legal foundations from urging the federal courts to 
inject § 3501 into their cases. 
In 1999, these legal groups gained a stunning 
victory when a 2-1 majority of a panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled - 
against the express wishes of the Department of 
Justice - that the pre-Miranda voluntariness test set 
forth in § 3501, rather than the famous Miranda 
case, governs the admissibility of confessions in the 
federal courts. According to the Fourth Circuit panel, 
the Miranda rules are not constitutionally required; 
they are only "prophylactic" rules designed to 
implement or reinforce the underlying constitutional 
right. Therefore, § 3501 is a valid exercise of 
congressional authority to override judicially created 
rules [that are] not part of the U.S. Constitution. 
I strongly disagree. I share the view of a number 
of criminal procedure and constitutional law 
professors that the Miranda rules were an 
understandable (and long overdue) response to the 
inadequacies of the mushy, subjective, and unruly 
voluntariness test (under which every factor was 
relevant, but virtually nothing was decisive). I agree, 
too, that prophylactic rules are a necessary and 
proper feature of constitutional law - a means of 
interpreting constitutional provisions in light of 
institutional realities - a means of providing 
constitutional rights much-needed "breathing space." 
But if the present Court were to address this issue in 
the near future, I am afraid that at least four justices 
might uphold the statute purporting to abolish 
Miranda (the Chief Justice and Justices OIConnor, 
Scalia, and Thomas). 
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P m f w  Khmisar, wide& known for his pioneering teaching I materials on c r i m i d p c e d u n  and his many articles dejiending 
and explaining the Warren Court's "revolution" in American 
m*rninalp'ocedure, is a specialist in constsnststutional h. He has 
studied the impact and a-th of the US. Supreme Court 
decision that produced what we now d l  the Miranda Rule since 
the decision was handed down in Miranda v. h n a  in 1966. 
H m  he iden t i i  three distinct threats to the protections the 
d i n g m d d f o r  suspects and dejietzdants. 
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Section 3501 is not the only danger facing 
Miranda. A decade and a half ago, in Oregon v. Elstad 
(1985), a case that upheld the admissibility of a 
second confession made at the time the police 
complied with Miranda, although earlier that day the 
police had obtained a statement from the same 
defendant - in violation of Miranda - the Supreme 
Court indicated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine did not apply to Miranda at all. If so, all the 
"fruits" of (or evidence derived from) a Miranda 
violation would be admissible - not just a second 
confession or a witness for the prosecution whose 
identity the government learned from the 
inadmissible confession, but physical evidence, e.g., 
the drugs, the proceeds from a bank robbery, or the 
marder weapon. 
The Court has never explicitly decided whether 
physical or nontestimonial evidence derived from a 
Miranda violation is admissible. However, I have to 
say there is a good chance i t  will do so. In the 
meantime, the state courts and the lower federal 
courts have almost uniformly ruled that the 
prosecution may use the nontestimonial fruits of a 
Miranda violation. 
Some 30 years ago, Judge Henry Friendly noted 
that "'what data there are' suggest that the obtaining 
of leads with which to obtain real or demonstrative 
evidence or prosecution witnesses is more important 
than getting statements for use in court." (Emphasis 
added.) Therefore, a ruling that all types of evidence 
derived from a Miranda violation are admissible 
would strike the landmark case a grievous blow. How 
could we possibly expect the police to comply with 
Miranda i f  the courts barred onlythe use of 
incriminating statements obtained in violation of that 
doctrine, but none of the leads or clues or evidence 
these statements brought to life? 
Miranda faces stil l another danger - there is 
good reason to think that in a substantial number of 
police stations throughout the land police 
interrogators are violating Miranda in a fundamental 
way. They are getting suspects to waive their rights 
- by persuading them it's in their "best interest" to 
tell the police "their side of the story" so the police 
can help them - before they advise them of their 
rights. 
These interrogation techniques were first 
described at length in David Simon's book, Homicide: 
A Year on the Killing Streets. The author, a Baltimore 
Sun reporter, was granted unlimited access to the 
city's homicide unit for a full year. Recent articles 
indicate that the interrogation tactics employed by 
the Baltimore police are being utilized by detectives in 
a number of other police departments as well. 
If the admissibility of a statement obtained as a 
result of these methods were challenged by a defense 
lawyer, a prosecutor would be in a strong position, for 
she would be armed with a signed waiver of rights 
form (and a signed explanation of rights form as 
well). But she would be in a strong position only i f  - 
as would hardly be surprising -the detective 
involved in the case conveniently failed to remember 
how the suspect was induced to sign the waiver of 
rights form. However, i f  all the details were known - 
if the entire transaction had been tape recorded - 
no court would be able to admit the statement unless 
i t  was prepared to overrule Miranda itself. 
(Unfortunately neither the Warren Court nor any 
other Supreme Court has ever required law 
enforcement officers to tape record, when feasible. 
how the warnings of rights are delivered, how the 
waiver takes place, and what the police do thereafter. 
And the overwhelming majority of state courts have 
held that the testimony of a police officer that he 
gave complete Miranda warnings and obtained a 
voluntary and intelligent waiver of rights need not be 
corroborated.) 
Miranda emphasizes that "any evidence" that a 
custodial suspect was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled 
into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant 
did not voluntarily waive his privilege." But in a 
substantial number of station houses, the police are 
threatening the suspect: they are telling him that 
unless he talks to them about the homicide, they will 
write it up as first degree murder and turn him over to 
a merciless assistant prosecutor. The police are also 
tricking the suspect: they are leading him to believe 
that it is in his best interest to tell them his side of the 
story. Indeed, the police are pretending that talking to 
the police instead of asking for a lawyer is the 
suspect's only chance to get the homicide charge 
reduced (or perhaps even dismissed). 
The police are not supposed to subject a custodial 
suspect to questioning unless and until they obtain a 
waiver of his rights. Unfortunately, what they are 
really doing in too many places is subjecting 
individuals t c  "interrogation" before they waive their 
rights - indeed, before they even advise them of 
their rights. 
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Once the police have taken a suspect into custody. 
there is no such thing (at least there is no lawful basis 
for any such thing) as a "preinterview" or "pre- 
waiver" interrogation. The waiver of rights transaction 
is supposed to take place as soon as the curtain goes 
up - not be postponed until the second act. 
Reports about how modern police interrogators 
have "adapted" to Miranda underscore the need to 
record on video- or audiotape the entire proceeding in 
the police station - any preliminary conversation, 
the reading of rights, the waiver transactions, and 
any subsequent interrogation. There is nothing new or 
startling a bout tape recording police questioning. 
Virtually all of the nation's criminal procedure 
professors - critics and defenders of Miranda alike 
-favor the idea. Moreover, there is widespread 
satisfaction with a mandatory recording requirement 
in Great Britain. Why then is tape recording, where 
feasible, not the general practice in American police 
stations today? 
The only startling thing about this issue is that, 
after all these years, American law enforcement 
officials are stil l able to prevent objective recordation 
of all the facts of police "interviews" or "conversations" 
with a suspect and, of course, how the warnings are 
delivered and how the waiver of rights is obtained. 
But i f  you were a member of the Baltimore homicide 
unit (or a member of other police departments 
employing the same interrogation methods), would 
you favor tape recording (and making available for 
public inspection) what really happens in the 
interrogation room? 
